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FROM : American Embassy Bonn 1784
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COPY NO. 1 SERIES A
May 29, 1959
DATE

TO : THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE, WASHINGTON.

REF : Tripartite Berlin Contingency Planning Paper of April 4, 1959
Bonn Desp. 1742, May 21, 1959

For Dept. Use Only	ACTION	DEPT.
	REC'D	OTHER
	6/5	CIA, OSD, ARMY, NAVY, AIR

SUBJECT: Berlin Contingency Planning - Air Access: For background information.

Attached are two copies of a second tripartitely agreed working level air access planning paper submitted to the three Ambassadors in Bonn. It presents measures which might be taken to continue civil air services to Berlin as long as possible (Paragraph 12b, Task 3 of the Paper under reference). While presenting an approach already the subject of detailed discussions between the U.S. Government and Pan American Airways, this paper represents an initial tripartite formulation of the problem. The British view this paper as the basis for a more positive approach to BEA. The French on the other hand have stated that their Government has the authority to require Air France and its pilots to continue operations as directed, but the Government has not yet indicated the conditions under which voluntary company operations would cease and Government-directed flights take place.

The attached paper is for background information. The Embassy will report when final action on it has been taken by the Three Embassies.

For the Ambassador:

Henry J. Tasca

Henry J. Tasca
Minister for Economic Affairs

Attachment: Two (2) copies
as stated.

Distribution:
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Berlin Contingency Planning

May 27, 1959

Encl. Day 1789
from Bonn - 5/29/59

Copy #1

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Ref: Tripartite Paper, dated April 4, para. 12(b) (J)

(Draft agreed by Mr. Radius, M. Charpy and Mr. Banfield
for submission to Ambassadors)

The Task:

Task 3 is defined in the tripartite paper of April 4 as follows:

"12(b) The three Embassies at Bonn, in consultation with the tripartite staff in Paris or with other military headquarters as appropriate, should review or complete contingency planning to deal with the following aspects of the Berlin air access question:-

- (3) Measures which might be taken to continue civil air services as long as possible in the event of any change in the present situation."

Policy Considerations

- (a) The Three Powers consider that continuation of commercial air services between Berlin and the Federal Republic is important politically, economically, and psychologically.
- (b) Consequently the Three Powers will take measures, consistent with the laws and regulations of each, to encourage and facilitate continued regularly scheduled civil flights between Berlin and the Federal Republic and to maintain the identity of the civil carriers involved. However, the decision whether any flight takes place remains with the companies and ultimately with the pilots.

Possible Hazards to be Faced

- (a) Soviet refusal to cooperate in the Berlin Air Safety Center (BASC):
Under presently agreed policy the substitution of a GDR BASC Controller for the Soviet Controller would not be permitted. If the Soviets withdraw and/or no longer "guarantee flight safety" by accepting flight plans, the ATC authorities of Tempelhof would have no positive assurance that Soviet or GDR movements in the corridors would not conflict with those of Western aircraft. It would be possible to rely to a certain extent on existing or improved radar facilities for air traffic separation and the increased hazard to flights between 2,500 and 10,000 feet (which altitudes are apparently little used by the Soviets) would be small. The air traffic control risk is, therefore, one which the airlines might be expected to accept in the circumstances, but passing of flight information to East Zone air traffic control authorities would be more reassuring to the carriers and pilots. (See Tripartite Paper on Task 1 Planning, May 15, 1959) In the final analysis, although the present situation would have definitely changed, the change would not of itself necessarily involve an unacceptable increase in hazard to flight safety, unless accompanied by clear threats and warnings concerning actions Soviets/GDR intend to take, or direct interference with flights.
- (b) Jamming of navigational aids: Jamming could include blocking of approach radar (GCA), VHF nav aids (VAR, VOR, ILS), UHF and VHF communications facilities, LF nav aids, and HF communications. Partial blocking might not stop flights, but the companies would

doubtless have to observe their navigational and landing minima, and there would inevitably be some loss in regularity depending on the weather conditions and the extent of the jamming.

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- (c) Indirect interference: Indirect interference might include the saturation of the corridors to Berlin by filing of Soviet flight plans whether or not followed by actual aircraft in flight. Such action might result in delay or even temporary cessation of flights since Tempelhof ATC would find it necessary to reserve at least initially the airspace for which Soviet flight plans had been filed. The extent to which such action would constitute a hazard requiring complete suspension of commercial flights could only be determined at the time.
- (d) Direct interference: Actual or threatened direct interference might include buzzing, ^{the erection of balloons,} and forcing down. Any of these actions would be sufficient to result in cessation of commercial flights.

Possible Course of Action Open to the Allies

Secure agreement from the civil airlines operating between Berlin and the Federal Republic as follows:

- (1) While the companies continue to exercise their normal responsibilities toward operational hazards affecting flight safety, they will look to their Embassies for evaluation of political developments which may involve an increase in danger to corridor flights. The decision whether to continue regularly scheduled commercial flights remains with the companies, and ultimately with the pilots.

- not problem after inquiries completed*
- (2) Arrangements for the dispatch of "probe" flights at the request of the Embassies in order to test Soviet/GDR intentions after regularly scheduled flights have ceased in the face of an Embassy identified danger should be discussed between each carrier and its Government.

- (3) The three governments should conclude special arrangements, where necessary, in order to guarantee the companies against losses incurred as a result of Soviet/GDR actions in the event of any change in the present situation, and to protect the pilots concerned.

Recommendation: The three Ambassadors recommend that the embassies in Bonn should accept the responsibility described in 1 above and that the three governments should take the action described in 2 and 3.